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Solis et al.: International Legal Updates

International Legal Updates
United States
Iraqis Sue Private U.S. Military
Contractors in U.S. Court
On September 16, 2007, a shootout
occurred at a busy highway intersection
in Baghdad, Iraq. Blackwater USA, a private security corporation contracted by the
U.S. government to provide security to
U.S. officials and military support to the
region, allegedly opened fire in the middle
of the intersection without provocation,
killing 17 Iraqi civilians. Many bystanders were shot when they attempted to flee.
Blackwater alleges that it responded in selfdefense after its guards were fired upon.
The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) reported that among the 17 killings,
only three may have been justified by the
guards’ fear that they were in imminent
danger and the remaining 14 killings were
without cause.
The recent events were neither the
first instances of Blackwater’s violent
actions in Iraq, nor unique. In May 2005 a
Blackwater helicopter and armored vehicle
released a potent tear gas without provocation against Iraqi and U.S. soldiers
guarding a checkpoint, which rendered
soldiers and highway travelers temporarily
blind. On September 17, after learning that
there had been over 200 recorded shootings by Blackwater guards in Iraq since
2005, the Interior Ministry of Iraq revoked
Blackwater’s license to operate in Iraq.
In addition to recent Iraqi investigations, the U.S. Congress reported that on
at least two occasions, Blackwater paid
modest sums to the families of victims in
exchange for their silence. Further findings
allege that U.S. State Department officials
approved of such payments.
While the FBI and U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) investigations remain ongoing, the victims of the September 16 attack
are seeking justice through civil litigation
in the U.S. court system. On October
11, the Center for Constitutional Rights
(CCR) filed a complaint on behalf of an
injured Iraqi civilian and three deceased

victims’ families, later amended to two
injured civilians and five families, against
Blackwater USA, Blackwater Security
Consulting LLC, the Prince Group (a holding company), and Erik Prince (founder of
Blackwater). The complaint alleges that
Blackwater “created and fostered a culture
of lawlessness amongst its employees,
encouraging them to act in the company’s
financial interests at the expense of innocent human life.” The complaint accuses
Blackwater of authorizing excessive use
of force through its failure to investigate
or punish its employees. In addition, it
contends that Blackwater knowingly and
routinely deploys heavily armed soldiers in
Baghdad who use steroids and other drugs
that affect and impair judgment. Plaintiffs
seek both compensatory and punitive damages.
Meanwhile, the DOJ notified Congress
during a private meeting in December that
it might be unable to file charges against
Blackwater due to a number of legal
obstacles, including the limited immunity offered to Blackwater employees in
exchange for their testimony during the
initial investigation into the September 16
incident.
The official joint recognition and condemnation of Blackwater’s actions by the
Iraqi and U.S. governments is essential to
the restoration of stability in the region,
and the actions of private security contractors in Iraq continue to threaten the credibility and safety of U.S. military forces.

U.S. Government Closes
Legal Loophole that Granted
Immunity to Perpetrators
of Genocide
On December 21, 2007, President Bush
signed into law the Genocide Accountability
Act (GAA). The GAA’s closes a loophole
that allowed individuals who participated
in committing genocide outside the United
States to avoid prosecution within the
United States. Prior to the GAA, individuals could be found guilty of genocide
only if the crime was committed within
28

the United States or by a U.S. national
outside the country. The GAA is aimed
specifically at perpetrators of the Rwandan
and Bosnian Genocides of the mid 1990s,
since individuals who participated in those
atrocities were thought to be escaping
justice while residing in the United States
under false pretenses. Senator Tom Coburn
(R-OK), who voted for the passage of GAA
stated, “Under no circumstances should an
individual who participated in genocide
be allowed to enjoy safe haven within the
United States … . Persons who committed
these heinous crimes should be punished to
the fullest extent of the law.”
The GAA is the first legislation to be
proposed by the Senate Subcommittee on
Human Rights Under the Law, chaired by
Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL). A primary aim
of the subcommittee is to combat genocide.
Members of the committee and legal community consider the GAA’s passage a huge
victory. According to law professor Diane
Orentlicher, who testified before Congress
in February and October 2007, “By passing
the Genocide Accountability Act of 2007,
Congress has struck a major blow against
the impunity that sustains perpetrators of
ghastly crimes. From now on, those who
have violated the basic code of humanity will know they cannot find sanctuary
here.”
While the GAA corrected an error
in achieving justice for past genocides,
the U.S. Congress also made efforts to
address the current genocide in Darfur. On
December 31, 2007, President Bush signed
into law the Sudan Accountability and
Divestment Act (SADA), which allows
state and local governments within the
United States to cease doing business with
companies with economic ties in Sudan and
prohibits federal contracts with any such
companies. Under SADA, mutual funds
and private pension managers may not sell
investments in companies affiliated with
Sudan, and states may prohibit debt financing for companies doing business in Sudan.
The legislation unanimously passed both
houses of Congress, but to ease worries
that it could potentially interfere with his
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ability to conduct foreign policy, President
Bush attached a signing statement which
permits him to overrule divestment decisions by states that may interfere with the
administration of foreign policy. Darfur
activist groups including the Save Darfur
Coalition, Genocide Intervention Network,
and STAND called for President Bush
to take measures to ensure that SADA is
strictly enforced.
While the effectiveness of GAA and
SADA remain to be seen, the laws gained
passage at a time of mounting concern
about inaction by the United States, and,
hopefully, reflect a growing U.S. government desire to combat genocide and bring
its perpetrators to justice.

Healthcare a Growing
Concern to United States and
Presidential Candidates
The U.S. healthcare system is a
key issue in the 2008 U.S. Presidential
Election. Both Republicans and Democrats
find numerous flaws in the current system,
which has been described as confusing,
exclusionary, and costly. The average U.S.
family spent $12,106 on healthcare in
2006. A 2005 U.S. Census Bureau report
found that 46.6 million U.S. citizens are
currently uninsured. The U.S. healthcare
system is based on a blend of public and
private for-profit healthcare. Private hospitals are motivated by profit maximization
in order to please shareholders, while there
is little incentive to improve the quality
of care. Not-for-profit and teaching hospitals have seven and 25 percent lower
death rates respectively, in comparison to
for-profit hospitals. Internationally, this
policy would pose serious questions about
the violation of the basic human right of
equal access to healthcare. As the country
begins to view these statistics as a crisis,
the candidates, mostly driven by the positions of their respective political parties,
have responded with comprehensive plans
detailing how each would resolve the critical issue.
The Republican candidates largely seek
to allow the market, rather than a federally
mandated system of universal coverage,
to correct the country’s privatized health
insurance system. This raises a number
of potential human rights violations. Most
Republicans favor a system that allows

private insurers and public programs the
ability to reward the healthy behavior of
individuals.
The Democratic approach calls for
a system of mixed private and public
healthcare with contribution mandates for
employers and individuals, and tax incentives designed to regulate the health insurance market. Democrats seek to reverse the
trend of falling employer-provided healthcare coverage, which has dropped from 69
percent to 60 percent since the year 2000.
The Democratic-proposed mandate would
require employers to either provide coverage for their employees or pay into a public
healthcare fund. The leading candidates’
healthcare plans are similar, with few distinguishing characteristics, including either
mandating individual health insurance for
every U.S. citizen or for children only. The
primary source of funding for the candidates’ programs would be the repeal of tax
cuts granted by President Bush for individuals earning over $250,000 annually.
While there are significant differences
in the policies of the two political parties,
both still fail to meet certain standards.
Neither party supports a shift from the current system, which focuses on healthcare
as a commodity, to one that supports it
as an individual right. As a result, human
rights concepts of equity give way to a
struggle of cost reduction and increased
access within a privatized profit-based system. As the war in Iraq begins to be seen as
less of a priority in the election, domestic
issues such as whether there is a right for
individuals of all incomes to have access to
healthcare have an opportunity to impact
the election of the next U.S. president.

Latin America
Honduras: Latin American
Water Tribunal Holds
Entremares de Honduras Liable
Before mining activities by Entremares
de Honduras, S.A., a subsidiary of Canada’s
Goldcorp Inc., polluted and dried up vital
water sources, the Siria Valley’s rivers
supplied communities in central Honduras
with drinking water. The Honduran government initially ignored local complaints
about the lack of water and water contamination created by Entremares de Honduras.
As a result, the Siria Valley Regional
Environmental Committee took the case to
29

the Latin American Water Tribunal, where
Entremares de Honduras was found liable
for “inappropriate use and contamination
of water sources in the Siria Valley region
and for causing harm and risk to the ecosystem and to human health.”
In 1994, Entremares de Honduras, S.A.
began to operate in Tegucigalpa. Four years
later, an American company, Glamis Gold
Limited, bought the Honduran company.
The company changed hands again in 2006
when it was purchased by Goldcorp, Inc. In
1998, immediately after Hurricane Mitch,
the country experienced a period of mining
law reform stimulated by Congressional
desire to jump start the economy. The
General Mining Law of 1999 reduced mineral export regulation, guaranteed mining
companies greater access to water supplies,
and dismantled environmental restrictions.
According to mining industry representatives, these reforms were a response to the
need to create more jobs and a modernized
mining industry, and to stimulate foreign
investment. From 1968 through 1998, not a
single foreign company opened operations
in Honduras.
The government granted Entremares
special concessions in 1998. Since then the
company has been using cyanide to extract
gold from mined ore, a cheap method that
has been banned in some countries and
severely restricted in others.
Two years later, communities living
around the mines began to complain of
a water shortage, water contamination,
and an increase of illnesses and skin disorders. But the complaints were futile, as
neither the government nor Entremares
did anything. On January 25, 2000, the
Siria Valley Regional Environmental
Committee denounced the destruction of
the forest, harm to the environment, and
contamination of the water. It called for a
government commission, but the company
suppressed test results confirming water
sources were contaminated with arsenic
and mercury. Despite the complaints and
the hidden reports, the Ministry of Natural
Resources and Environment (SERNA)
allowed Entremares to dig five new wells.
SERNA confirmed that the water
in Siria Valley was contaminated in
September 2006. A year later, SERNA
imposed a one million Lempira ($55,000)
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fine on Entremares for polluting and damaging activities that violated Honduran
environmental laws and the company’s
contract with the government. In response,
Entremares promised to regenerate the
forests affected but refused to pay the
fine. Gabino Santos Carvajal, the Director
of the Mining Association, stated that a
court decision was necessary to prove that
Entremares committed a crime, and that
scientific reports alone were insufficient.
On the other hand, Caritas Tegucigalpa, a
development and social service organization, suggested that Entremares refused
to pay because it did not want to accept
liability, and because it suspected that the
Honduran legal system was too weak to
enforce a payment.
The Siria Valley Regional Environmental Committee responded by bringing the
case before the Latin American Water
Tribunal, an autonomous, independent,
and international organization of environmental justice. Although its decision
is non-binding, the tribunal found that
Entremares is accountable for the damage
to the environment as a result of irresponsible use of water in Siria Valley, Honduras.
Entremares has not issued a response to the
hearing. However, on October 11, 2007,
the tribunal held that Entremares must take
responsibility for inappropriate use and
contamination of water sources, should
suspend all mining activity in the valley,
and should compensate the communities
for the damage caused.

Belize: Supreme Court Ruling
Supports Mayan Customary
Land Rights
In a landmark legal victory for Belize’s
Maya population, the Supreme Court of
Belize recently granted Maya communities in Southern Belize customary rights to
and official recognition of their lands. The
Government of Belize, however, has yet to
demarcate and issue titles for these lands.
In Belize, the Mayans are the largest indigenous group with the majority
of them living in villages throughout the
country. The British established some of
these villages as official Maya indigenous
reservations for the benefit of the Maya
people. The Belize government asserted
ownership to these villages. Other unofficial Maya indigenous villages are located

on currently designated “national land.”
These communities do not enjoy the special protections that come with the official
recognition of a Maya indigenous reservation. Although the existence and location
of these communities is common knowledge among the people of Belize, for many
years the government failed to recognize
Maya land with official titles. The government’s policy of non-recognition is based
on British colonial explorers’ original map
showing these lands to be uninhabited.
Since 1993, the Government of Belize
has granted permits to various foreign
companies to prospect land in the Toledo
district. The Toledo district is both recognized as “national land,” and is claimed
by the Mayans. In addition to allowing
exploration of the land, the government has
granted at least 17 logging concessions,
covering a total area of 480,000 acres to
foreign companies. The government set
up only a fraction of the 500,000 acres as
nine Maya reserves. Maya representatives
filed suit in 2000 against the government,
leading to the signing of the “Ten Points of
Agreement,” which stipulates that the government recognize Maya land rights. The
government failed to grant any land titles
and continued to allow foreign companies
to exploit contested land. On April 3, 2007,
representatives of the Maya villages of
Conejo and Santa Cruz filed claims in two
separate lawsuits, alleging that the government was in violation of the Constitution
of Belize because it failed to recognize,
protect, and respect the customary land
rights of the Maya community based on
traditional land use and occupation. The
Supreme Court consolidated the lawsuits
into one proceeding.
On October 18, 2007, in a 67-page
judgment, the Supreme Court of Belize
affirmed the customary land rights of
Mayans residing in the villages of Conejo
and Santa Cruz. The judgment recognized
the customary right of all Maya villages
to their land, based on traditional use and
occupancy. The judgment states that the
government has violated the rights of the
Mayans in its failure to protect their land.
The Supreme Court asked the government
to demarcate the rights of Mayans and
provide them with official land titles, and
to stop giving land use permits to outsiders.
This is the first legal decision citing the
recent United Nations Declaration on the
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Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by
the General Assembly in September of last
year. As a result, it has significant precedential value for indigenous rights cases
across the globe.

Popular Referendum Defeats
Proposed Venezuelan
Constitutional Changes
On August 15, 2007, Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez proposed to amend
33 articles of Venezuela’s 350-article constitution to make it consistent with his
socialist agenda. According to Chavez, the
proposed reforms were necessary to complete the transition to a socialist republic.
Detractors said the reforms formed part
of a strategy to increase Chavez’s power.
Human Rights Watch warned that the proposals included changes that could violate
international law. For example, one proposal would have increased presidential
emergency powers; giving the president
the power to suspend fundamental due process guarantees such as the presumption of
innocence, the right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal and the right
against self-incrimination during a state of
emergency. The proposed changes would
have also allowed the president to suspend
citizens’ rights to information. Changes
perceived as positive included an expansion of social security benefits to workers
and an expansion of the existing constitutional prohibition on discrimination based
on sexual and political orientation.
The proposals led those Venezuelans
in opposition to Chavez to unite. On
November 7, 2007, an anti-referendum
protest turned into a riot at the Central
University of Venezuela. Several days
before the referendum, about 160,000 people protested in the streets. The opposition
to President Chavez included some of
his previous allies such as General Raul
Baduel, former Minister of Defense, who
publically withdrew his support of the
government.
On December 2, 2007, a popular referendum narrowly defeated the proposed
amendments. Despite his loss, Chavez
vowed to continue his struggle to build
socialism. Three days after the elections,
he warned U.S. to “watch out,” as he
planned to launch a renewed offensive
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to change the constitution. In addition,
approximately one month later, Chavez
announced that 2008 would be the year of
“the three R’s;” revision, rectification, and
re-launching.

Africa
Disputed Election Results
Spark Crisis In Kenya
Kenya, once hailed as a beacon of
African democracy, has erupted in violence following a highly disputed presidential election. The election results, in which
President Mwai Kibaki was re-elected over
opposition member Raila Odinga, have
sparked accusations of election rigging
and have led to deadly clashes between
members of the Luos tribe, who support
Odinga, and members of the Kikuyu tribe,
who support Kibaki. The Luos, who make
up about 13 percent of Kenya’s population
of 36 million, live mostly in the western
part of the country. They also make up a
large portion of the population of some of
the capital Nairobi’s most notorious slums.
Members of the Kikuyu tribe, who have
strong economic and political power, make
up about 22 percent of Kenya’s population,
and come mostly from the central region of
the country.
December’s election results are the closest in Kenyan history, with Kibaki reportedly beating Odinga by roughly 230,000
votes, after 8.9 million votes had been cast.
Odinga had been leading the polls in the
week leading up to the election. During the
vote-counting on December 27, opposition
party leader Odinga was about one million votes ahead of Kibaki. However, the
counting process turned sour after a number of Kibaki strongholds delayed their
voting results. Several election officers
disappeared with ballot boxes, and others
refused to answer their phones until Kibaki
was eventually announced as the victor.
These incidents prompted various
observer groups to determine that the vote
was unfairly handled. The European Union
(EU) added that it had evidence of a
rigged election. Head of the EU Election
Observation Mission in Kenya Alexander
Lambsdorff cited “discrepancies in vote
counts, election observers being turned
away from polling places, and observers being refused entrance to the electoral commission vote-count room.” On

December 31, the United States, through
its embassy in Nairobi, voiced its concerns
over the “serious problems experienced
during the voting counting process…
[which] included various anomalies with
respect with unrealistically high voter turnout rates, close to 100 percent in some constituencies.” International observers have
since concluded that the election fell short
of international best practice standards for
democratic elections.
Immediately following the election
results, rioters swarmed the streets, burning and looting buildings. Protesters chanting “Kibaki must go!” wielded machetes
amidst the chaos. In the days following the
results, more incidents of violence have
been reported. Mobs of young men, armed
with machetes, appear to have burned
down a church where Kikuyu tribe members were seeking refuge from the violence. The Red Cross reported that at least
50 people were burned to death, including
dozens of women and children. Other
reported injuries included gun-shot wounds
and cuts from machete-like weapons. The
United Nations (UN) reported that at least
250,000 people had been displaced by the
violence, and, as of January 7, the Kenyan
government reported the death toll to be
more than 500.
In an attempt to ease the escalating
tensions and violence in the country,
Ghanaian President John Kufuor, Head of
the African Union (AU), arrived in Kenya
on January 8 to mediate between opposition leader Odinga and President Kibaki.
Odinga refused Kibaki’s invitation for an
official meeting, however, describing the
invitation as “public relations gimmickry.”
The failure of the AU to mediate between
the two parties resulted in a call for mass
protests in 25 towns and cities by Odinga’s
opposition party. On January 10, 2008, it
was reported that former UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan would attempt to
mediate between the two parties. This
news came after Kibaki appointed 17 new
Cabinet members, none of whom are affiliated with Odinga’s party.

craft. Officials from one northern Angolan
town report as many as 400 street children that have been accused of witchcraft,
abused, and abandoned by their families. Furthermore, a report issued by the
National Institute for the Child described
a “massive” number of children accused of
engaging in witchcraft. Fear of witchcraft
is a common among Angola’s Bantu: many
Bantu believe that witches can communicate with the world of the dead, causing
the alleged witches’ victims misfortune,
illness, and death. Families faced with
disruptions in their lives will often blame
a child “witch” for causing the disruptions
and cast him or her out of the home.
According to Angolan officials, the rising number of children accused of witchcraft can be attributed to the long conflict
that has burdened Angolan families with
many hardships. Angola endured 27 years
of war, leaving a large number of children
orphaned. Other families struggled to feed
and sustain themselves during these years.
As a result, families unable to take care
of their children will often accuse them of
witchcraft to justify their expulsion from
the home.
The Angolan government has been
campaigning against the widely held belief
in child witchcraft. In October 2007, the
Angolan government participated in the
Second Pan-African Forum on Children.
In addition, Angolan delegates participated
in a United Nations meeting devoted to
children’s rights. The Angolan government
is striving to prioritize discussions about
“neglect, abuse, physical violence, emotional violence and discrimination against
children … and the phenomenon of children accused of witchcraft.”

Zambian Women Face
Obstruction to HIV Medication

Growing Number of Accusations
of Child Witchcraft Increases
Child Homelessness in Angola

A recent report by Human Rights
Watch (HRW) describes the abuses faced
by Zambian women who are prevented
access to antiretroviral medication for
their treatment of HIV. According to the
report, approximately 17 percent of the
adult Zambian population has HIV/AIDS.
Women make up about 57 percent of this
number.

A rising number of children in Angola
are being accused of engaging in witch-

Zambian women face increased risks
of violence and abuse at the hands of their
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spouses, even upon discussion of HIV testing and treatment, and the resulting fear
has prevented them from seeking services
from clinics, including HIV status testing.
This has delayed pursuits of HIV/AIDS
treatment. These delays have resulted in
many women missing clinic appointments,
while others are unable to keep up with
their medication.
In addition to the fear of spousal abuse,
Zambian women are also facing obstruction to property rights. Women in Zambian
society traditionally do not have property
rights equal to those of men. Divorced or
widowed women fear losing their homes
or their land. As a result, women often feel
forced to remain in dependent, abusive
relationships or marriages. According to
HRW, these women “struggled to pay for
transport to clinics for HIV treatment and
counseling and to afford the food they
need for treatment to succeed.” Nada Ali, a
researcher in the Women’s Rights Division
of HRW commented, “Unless the Zambian
government introduces legal and health
system reform and removes the barriers to
HIV treatment that women face, genderbased abuses will continue to shatter the
lives of countless Zambian women in acute
need of antiretroviral treatments … .”
The HRW report calls for the Zambian
government to take the necessary steps to
establish legislation, both civil and criminal, that will remedy and prevent domestic
violence, and to finalize the draft constitution, which specifically includes provisions
that prohibit discrimination against women
on the basis of law, custom, culture, or
tradition. Additionally, HRW is calling for
the government to allow healthcare providers to respond more effectively to issues of
gender-based abuses and violence.

Middle East and North Africa
Morocco: Arrests for
Homosexual Conduct Violate
Right to Privacy
On December 10, 2007, the Court of
First Instance in Ksar el-Kbir, Morocco
convicted six men for violating Article 489
of the Moroccan Penal Code by engaging in homosexual conduct. Article 489
“criminalizes lewd or unnatural acts with
an individual of the same sex,” with sentences between six months and three years

in prison and fines of 120 to 1,200 dirhams ($15 to $150). The men have been
in detention since they were first arrested
by police in November 2007, after a video
of a private party that the men allegedly
attended circulated on YouTube. Press
reports claimed the party was a gay marriage. The court sentenced three defendants
to six months in prison, two defendants
to four months, and the sixth, who was
also charged with the unauthorized sale of
alcohol, to ten months. The case prompted
violent protests in which hundreds of men
and women denounced the alleged actions
of the men involved.
The case raised two major human
rights issues. First, criminalizing homosexual conduct is a violation of human
rights under international law, and as such,
Article 489 of the Moroccan Penal Code
violates international law. Second, even if
one accepts the law as valid, the accused
were convicted without sufficient evidence
to prove that there was an Article 489
violation; raising an arbitrary detention
concern.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) maintains that criminalizing consensual, adult
homosexual conduct violates human
rights protection in international law.
The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), a treaty which
Morocco has ratified, bars interference
with the right to privacy. According to
Article 17 of the ICCPR, “No one shall
be subjected to unlawful interference with
his [or her] privacy.” Thus, arresting individuals for any private sexual activity
would be a human rights violation. In addition, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee (UNHCR), which monitors
implementation of the ICCPR, has explicitly condemned laws prohibiting consensual homosexual conduct as violations of
the ICCPR. UNHCR has no enforcement
power but may make recommendations to
the UN General Assembly.
A trial judge convicted the men despite
the fact that the prosecution did not prove
a violation of Article 489 of the Moroccan
Penal Code. In addition to a lack of conclusive evidence demonstrating that the
men were in fact at the party in question,
the video also contained no indications of
sexual activity. Furthermore, the video was
the only evidence offered to support the
32

homosexual conduct violation. The trial
judge refused to release the men provisionally, pending appeals.
HRW has appealed to the Moroccan
government to set aside the criminal verdicts in the case. In a letter to Moroccan
Justice Minister Abdelwahed Radi, HRW
urged the government to drop the charges
and release the men. In light of violence
that ensued following their arrests, the letter also implored the government to ensure
the men’s safety. The Moroccan government has yet to respond. HRW asserts that
the Moroccan government must uphold
their international human rights obligations
and release the men immediately.

Saudi Dissident Blogger
Arrested for Political Activism
Popular Saudi blogger Fouad al-Farhan
was arrested in December for his online
support of ten political activists that the
Saudi government accuses of supporting
terrorism. This is the first reported arrest
of an online critic of the government in
the kingdom. Among the thousands of
male and female bloggers in the kingdom,
Farhan is one of the few who uses his real
name. Through his blog (www.alfarhan.
org), Farhan criticizes corruption and calls
for political reform. According to Farhan’s
wife, he was arrested at his Jiddah office
and then brought by authorities home,
where his laptop was confiscated.
Although Farhan has not been officially charged with a crime, Major General
Mansour al-Turki asserted that Farhan was
arrested for “violating rules not related to
state security.” This suggests that Farhan’s
blog was not deemed to be dangerous to
the national security interests of Saudi
Arabia. On the contrary, the circumstances
surrounding Farhan’s arrest point to the
Saudi Arabian government exerting its
power to suppress unpalatable political
criticism. Since his arrest, Farhan has been
held in indefinite detention without charge
or trial.
Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy
that restricts freedom of speech and press.
The government does not allow political
parties or civil rights groups to exist, nor
does it permit public gatherings. Since
King Abdullah took the throne in 2005,
official tolerance of criticism and debate
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has grown. According to the U.S. State
Department’s latest human rights report,
however, news outlets remain censored,
and internet access is restricted. In early
December Farhan had been warned that he
would be detained because of his online
support for a group of men arrested in
February 2007 who were being held without charge or trial. The Jiddah-based group
— made up of academics, businessmen,
and one former judge — had been accused
of supporting terrorism. The men’s attorney said they were arrested for political
activism and their plans to form a civil
rights group.
Under Article 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
“everyone has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media
and regardless of frontiers.” The UDHR
is a declaration rather than a treaty, but
it embodies fundamental principles that
are accepted as customary international
law. Hence, Farhan’s case seems to fall
squarely under Article 19: under international law, bloggers should be protected
from criminal charges that are based on
their political criticism of a government.
While the Saudi Arabian government has
violated a recognized principle of international law by arresting Farhan, the UDHR
provides no enforcement mechanism to
compel the Saudi Arabian government to
respect bloggers’ freedom of expression.
More than 200 bloggers in Saudi Arabia
have voiced opposition to Farhan’s arrest,
and bloggers from around the world are
advocating for his release. Farhan’s friends
have maintained his blog while he is in
detention. In an e-mail written prior to
his arrest, Farhan indicated that he would
remain in custody for three days at most
if he agreed to sign a letter of apology.
But Farhan has refused to apologize for
his blog content, and, thus, continues to be
detained at the Ministry of Interior’s security service headquarters in Jiddah.

Israel Fuel Cuts to Gaza Stir
Fears of a Humanitarian Crisis
In early January, the Israeli Supreme
Court rejected a request for an injunction against fuel cuts to the Gaza Strip.

The Court refused to grant the injunction
because the ten Palestinian and Israeli
human rights groups responsible for the
request failed to prove that the fuel cuts
would harm humanitarian aid work. Israel
strategically implemented the fuel cuts to
stop daily rocket fire at Israel by Gaza militants. The Court ruled that reducing fuel
supplies could hinder the militants’ offensive against border towns. The potential for
the situation to escalate into a humanitarian crisis, however, prompted the Court
to monitor the effects of the fuel cuts on
Gaza’s civilians.
According to Gisha, one of the human
rights group that challenged the fuel cuts,
these measures do not stop aggression but
serve to punish the civilian population
of Gaza. This situation creates a balance
of human suffering on both sides of the
border. HRW alleges that Israel’s decision to cut the fuel is a violation of a basic
principle of international humanitarian law
that prohibits a government that controls
a territory from attacking or withholding
objects essential to the survival of the
civilian population. The act also allegedly violates Israel’s duty as an occupying
power to safeguard the health and welfare
of the population under occupation. Israeli
officials, however, have declared Gaza a
“hostile territory,” and claim that Israel is
no longer obliged under international law
to supply utilities to the civilian population. HRW asserts that this is a misstatement of humanitarian law, and that a mere
declaration does not negate the status and
obligations of an occupying power.
Israeli officials also noted that while
Gaza uses the fuel received from Israel
to power its electrical plant, about 70
percent of its electricity is routed directly
from Israel through cables. This supply of
electricity has not been stopped as a result
of the fuel cuts. One Health Ministry official, however, has warned that a continued
embargo could produce a health catastrophe in which doctors would have to cut
electricity to infants in maternity wards or
patients in open heart surgery.
On January 22, Israeli Defense Minister
Ehud Barak said that he would allow a single shipment of fuel and medical supplies
into the Gaza Strip. Prior to this concession, UN officials warned that food aid to
hundreds of thousands of residents would
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be suspended because UN trucks would
run out of fuel. While a single shipment
of fuel may temporarily alleviate fears of
imminent crisis, the Israeli government’s
commitment to the fuel cutoff suggests that
humanitarian concerns will continue.

Europe
Azerbaijani Government
Suppresses Freedom of Press
Ilgar Nasibov, a correspondent for the
U.S. government-funded Radio Liberty,
was convicted of slander and sentenced
to three months imprisonment in what
was an alleged violation of the European
Convention on Human Rights. Nasibov’s
imprisonment in December 2007 made
him the tenth journalist to serve jail time in
Azerbaijan that year. Media repression is
a recurring problem in Azerbaijan, which
imprisons more journalists than any other
country in Europe or Central Asia and
has the fifth-highest number of reporters
behind bars in the world.
Nasibov, who reports regularly on
human rights violations from Azerbaijan’s
semi-independent and geographicallyseparated region of Nakhchivan, was
convicted of slander following events in
early November. The Deputy Chief of
the Nakhchivan City Police Department
accused Nasibov’s wife Malahet Nasibova,
also a journalist who frequently reports
on human rights abuses in the region, of
being a “traitor.” Nakhchivan Police Chief
Ershad Ibrahimov then filed a slander
lawsuit against Nasibov based on an email
Nasibov sent to the President of Azerbaijan,
complaining that Nakhchivan journalists
were routinely harassed by local police.
Nasibov was convicted of slander under
Article 147.1 of the Azerbaijan Criminal
Code, which typically only applies to mass
media. It remains unclear how Ibrahimov
learned of the email and its contents.
Nasibov was reportedly denied legal
representation and taken to the basement of
the police department — where torture has
reportedly taken place in the past — immediately following his conviction. While he
was in prison, the Azerbaijan Department
of the Interior searched Nasibov’s home
and confiscated the couple’s computer
and disks. This search was carried out in
connection with a separate slander lawsuit
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filed against the Nasibov by Isa Habibeyli,
a member of Azerbaijan’s Parliament and
Director of Nakhchivan State University.
Following international outcry, Nasibov
was released four days after being jailed.
The Nakhchivan City Court annulled the
original slander suit and 90-day sentence
but sentenced the journalist to one year of
probation in the libel suit brought by Isa
Habibeyi. Nasibov reported that although
he was not subjected to physical torture, as
many feared, the Nakhchivan authorities
did put him under severe psychological
pressure and threatened him.
Critics, including the Council of
Europe and the U.S. Department of State,
have issued statements of disapproval in
response to the deterioration of media freedom in Azerbaijan. They declared the government’s treatment of Nasibov a violation
of the freedom of expression enshrined in
Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights.

Gaddafi’s Paris visit Casts
Doubt on Sarkozy’s Commitment
to Human Rights
French President Nicolas Sarkozy faced
strong criticism after hosting Libyan leader
Muammar Gaddafi in Paris for five days
in December. The trip was meant to symbolize improving relations between Libya
and Europe and marked Gaddafi’s first
visit to France in 34 years. Since emerging
from diplomatic isolation in 2003, Gaddafi
has attempted to strengthen his ties with
the West by renouncing plans to develop
weapons of mass destruction and taking
responsibility for past terrorist acts.
Sarkozy is the first European leader
to welcome Gaddafi since he released six
foreign medical workers in July 2007.
The French president’s involvement in the
release was subjected to harsh criticism
given the nature of Gaddifi’s actions; the
five Bulgarian nurses and one Palestinian
doctor were unlawfully jailed and put on
death row after being accused of deliberately infecting hundreds of children with
HIV in 1999. Plans for Gaddafi’s trip
to Paris as well as preliminary business
arrangements were made while Sarkozy
visited Libya immediately after the nurses’
and doctor’s release. In connection with
the prisoners’ release, the European Union

and Libya signed a memorandum of
understanding in July 2007, which also
suggested areas of future collaboration
between Europe and Libya. Libya’s ties
with Europe continued to strengthen in
October 2007, when the European Union
General Affairs and External Relations
Council continued negotiating with Libya
on a framework agreement concerning
collaboration on areas of mutual interest,
including migration and human rights.
The primary purpose of Gaddafi’s
December visit to Paris was to negotiate business with Sarkozy. Contracts
signed by the two leaders will amount
to revenue of approximately ten billion
euros for France, with Libya agreeing
to purchase aircrafts, military helicopters,
armored vehicles and missiles. France is
also expected to provide Libya with a
nuclear reactor. During the trip, Gaddafi
had an audience with the French President
twice, met with parliament, and attended a
dinner at the Presidential Palace on World
Human Rights Day.
The French public questions whether
Sarkozy has sacrificed his commitment
to human rights, which he declared at
the beginning of his presidency, in favor
of profits by making business deals with
a leader who has a questionable human
rights record. Public disapproval became
even more intense after Gaddafi publicly
accused France of abusing immigrants at
the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization headquarters in
Paris and denied that he and Sarkozy had
discussed the subject of human rights in
their first meeting.
Sarkozy notably faced criticism from
his own staff. Rama Yade, the French
Junior Minister for Human Rights, declared
that Gaddafi needed to accept that France
“isn’t a doormat upon which a leader,
whether terrorist or not, can come to wipe
off the blood of his crimes.” Much of the
controversy stems from Libya’s refusal
to extradite the terrorists responsible for
the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988. In 2003,
Libya formally accepted responsibility and
compensated the families of those killed in
the bombing. Many believe that Sarkozy
should not welcome a leader who has
admitted to involvement with terrorists.
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Sarkozy has attempted to justify the
business transactions, claiming that the
Arab world does not consider Gaddafi
a dictator. Sarkozy was also effective in
requesting that Gaddafi condemn terrorism.
The Libyan leader promptly denounced
al Qaeda’s December car bombings in
Algeria.
Human rights groups have responded
to the growing ties between Libya and
Europe with caution. They note that the
European Union must set benchmarks for
human rights improvements before going
ahead with business negotiations.

Georgia Lowers Age of
Criminal Responsibility
President Mikheil Saakashvili signed
a set of amendments to the Georgian
Criminal Code reducing the age of criminal responsibility from 14 to 12. The
amendments will enter into force on July
1, 2008, and were introduced in response
to a recent increase in juvenile crime in the
former Soviet state.
Juvenile crime in Georgia has been
steadily rising recently, with an almost
50 percent increase since 2005, mostly
attributed to petty theft. According to the
United Nations Children’s Fund’s 2007
Juvenile Justice Assessment, the percentage of juvenile offenders imprisoned more
than doubled between 2000 and 2006.
Experts attribute the rise in teenage crime
to a breakdown of traditional values following Georgia’s post-Soviet transition
during the 1990s.
The change in Georgian law contradicts international and European norms
that generally advocate using 18 as the age
of criminal responsibility and emphasize
that imprisoning children should be a last
resort. The United Nations (UN) has issued
several guidelines, including the Standard
Minimum Rules for the Administration of
Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules) and
the Rules for the Protection of Juveniles
Deprived of their Liberty. Several other
international guidelines, including the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and
the European Social Charter, exemplify the
profound international consensus against
the imprisonment of children except under
extreme circumstances.
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Georgian practice, in adopting a widely
criticized zero-tolerance policy towards
young offenders, runs counter to international standards. Through this policy,
the Georgian government is attempting to
deter young people from criminal behavior
by showing them that they will face punishment for their actions. Emphasizing the
deterrent purpose of this law, the Georgian
government claims that judges, prosecutors, and investigators with special training
in dealing with youth will prosecute and
try the juvenile offenders, who will then be
imprisoned in penitentiaries that are separate from adult facilities.
Critics note that Georgia has yet to produce these separate facilities and specialists. The amendments contradict the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child’s
February 2007 recommendation that countries should not lower their age of criminal
responsibility to 12. Although Georgia
signed the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, it still has not implemented its
guidelines. Critics believe that while lowering the age of criminal responsibility will
result in the imprisonment of more children, it will not deter juvenile crime.
Organizations advocating children’s
rights, including the UN and the European
Network of Ombudspeople for Children,
suggest that juvenile offenders imprisoned
at an early age are more likely to continue on a criminal path throughout their
lives. These organizations suggest that a
more effective strategy for dealing with
Georgia’s rise in juvenile crime would be
to adopt measures to educate, reintegrate,
and rehabilitate young offenders, as suggested in the Convention on the Rights of
the Child. In this way, juveniles could still
understand the gravity of their behavior,
but learn how to become adults that contribute to Georgian society.

Central and South Asia
Sri Lankan Supreme Court
Orders Ban on Nighttime
Cordon-and-Search Operations
On January 7, 2008, the Supreme Court
of Sri Lanka issued an order banning
cordon-and-search operations under the
Emergency Proclamation of 2006 between
the hours of 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.,
except in extraordinary circumstances. The
Court also ordered that at least one police

officer be present during military searches
and arrests in emergency situations. The
order was an interim response to a petition
filed by the Ceylon Workers’ Federation
(CFW) in opposition to the arrests of 2,000
Tamils following a bomb explosion. While
most of those arrested were released after
they proved their identity, some remained
in detention. The Court ordered the immediate release of 198 detained prisoners and
decided to look into the CFW’s petition in
February.
Cordon-and-search operations allow
the army to seal off areas, preventing
people from entering or exiting while
security forces arrest people within the
secured area. Entire communities of Tamil
people have been intimidated by the army
during these nighttime cordon-and-search
operations even though many were not
part of the Liberation Tamil Tigers Ealam
(LTTE), a separatist group that many identify as a terrorist organization. Human
rights activists describe the operations as
“collective punishment” that penalizes
communities for the crimes of a few members and argue that such raids frighten and
harass residents.
The Emergency Proclamation of 2006
allowed security forces to undertake search
operations and gave them power to arrest
and detain people for an indefinite period
of time in areas of violence. This provision, which allows arbitrary searches and
arrests for unspecified periods, violates
Article 9 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, to which Sri
Lanka is a signatory. After the Emergency
Proclamation came into effect, human
rights groups reported a drastic increase
in disappearances and killings. In 2007,
400 Tamils were evicted from the capital
city of Colombo and forced to the northern
and eastern regions of the country, where
Tamils have a majority. After international
outcry over these forced evictions, the government allowed the evicted Tamils back
into Colombo.
The Court ordered all permanent road
blocks illegal and unnecessary following
a petition by the Deputy Inspector General
of Police requesting that the court bar
parking of vehicles along a busy route to
prevent road-side bombs. In December
2007, the Centre for Policy Alternatives
petitioned the Court to stop mass arrests
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of Tamils and asked the court to establish
specific guidelines for authorities to follow
in arresting and detaining persons during the emergency. These guidelines will
become increasingly necessary to protect
against abuses by Sri Lankan authorities
now that the truce agreement with the
LTTE has ended.
The Tamils have been fighting for
an independent state for 35 years. In the
past, the Court has been criticized for
acting in collusion with the government
to suppress fundamental rights by reducing criminal law safeguards. Recent cases
suggest, however, that the Court is now
discouraging human rights abuses against
the Tamils.

High Court of Calcutta Finds
Land Acquisition Legal
The High Court of Calcutta recently
held that West Bengal’s acquisition of
private land for a car factory was legal.
In late 2006, one of the world’s largest manufacturers of commercial vehicles,
Tata Motors, sought the help of the West
Bengal government to identify a location for a new manufacturing facility.
The West Bengal Industrial Development
Corporation (WBIDC), a state body, identified 1,000 acres of agricultural land in
Singur for this purpose. WBIDC located
farmers that could prove legal title to the
land, compensated them and then transferred land ownership to Tata Motors.
In February 2007, farmers, human
rights activists, and lawyers petitioned the
High Court of Calcutta, arguing that the
government’s acquisition of the Singur
land for industrial development, and the
manner in which it was obtained, was illegal. Petitioners also argued that the government’s land acquisitions were fraudulent
and obtained against the will of the land
owners. The Court held that the land acquisition was for a public purpose and thus
was a bona fide exercise of power by the
government.
The Land Acquisition Act of 1894
reflects the principle of eminent domain,
allowing the government to acquire land
for a public purpose. This principle is also
manifested in Article 300-A of the Indian
Constitution — replacing Article 42, guaranteeing property as a fundamental right
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— which recognizes property rights as
legal but not fundamental rights and allows
the government to take land from landowners as long it is done fairly. The Act was
later amended to allow the government to
acquire land for a company “engage[ed] in
any industry or work for a public purpose”
in the Land Acquisition Rules. “Public
purpose” is not defined but has been interpreted to include government purchase for
private industry; however, the government
is required to compensate those who hold
legal title.
In this case, the High Court assessed
whether the government acquired the land
for a “public purpose.” The petitioners
argued that the acquisition was in the interest of Tata Motors and did not benefit the
people of Singur; thus, it did not meet the
qualifications required for a “public purpose.” Furthermore, petitioners argued that
the government of West Bengal acquired
the land without the land holders’ consent.
WBIDC refuted this position arguing that
it had complied with the rules and policies and that the transaction qualified as a
public purpose.
In their argument, petitioners relied on
a recent Indian Supreme Court decision
which held that the government of Punjab
acted illegally in its acquisition of agricultural land for a tractor company. The
High Court distinguished the two cases
by emphasizing that the compensation in
the Punjab case was minimal: the state
had only paid 100 rupees (approximately
$2.50) to the land owners. Furthermore,
the High Court pointed out that the tractor
company actually made the land purchase
directly. In contrast, the West Bengal government compensated the Singur landowners itself and then transferred the land to
the WBIDC, which entered into a lease
with Tata Motors. Taking these issues into
consideration, the High Court held that
the Singur land acquisition was acquired
in the public interest, was acquired fairly,
and was legal under India’s land acquisition laws.
For the past two years, similar land
disputes involving government acquisition
of private land for industry have led to violent protests. To date, hundreds of private
industrial projects have been approved by
the Indian government, and hundreds more
are still pending. Petitioners in this case

plan to file an appeal to the Supreme Court
of India.

Uzbekistani Refugees in
Kyrgyzstan Present New
Legal Questions
After the Andijan massacre of May
2005, in which hundreds of protesting
Uzbekistani civilians were killed by government troops, Uzbekistanis have been
seeking asylum in Kyrgyzstan and other
neighboring countries. Some refugees have
obtained asylum through the Kyrgyzstani
government. Many, however, have not
applied for asylum in Kyrgyzstan due to
fear of being returned to Uzbekistan by
Kyrgyzstani authorities.
Kyrgyzstan is a signatory of several international conventions protecting the rights of refugees including the
United Nations Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees. This convention
obliges Kyrgyzstan not to return persons
“who have a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular
social group, or political opinion … ;”
are outside the country of their nationality; and are unable to return to it due to
their fear of being persecuted. Kyrgyzstan
and Uzbekistan are also signatories of the
Minsk Agreement, signed by the members of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), which includes Russia and
other former Soviet republics. Under this
agreement, Kyrgyzstan is bound to protect
the rights of citizens from CIS countries
and is prohibited from extraditing persons
in cases where the persons may be tortured.
At the same time, the agreement requires
a signatory state, such as Kyrgyzstan, to
extradite persons when a fellow CIS member state mandates their arrest for crimes in
their home country, provided that a similar
crime exists in the deporting country.
Uzbekistan, citing the Minsk Agreement,
urges Kyrgyz authorities to return persons
accused of crimes in the Andijan massacre. To maintain good ties with its neighbor and comply with its responsibilities
under the Minsk Agreement, Kyrgyzstan
extradited some refugees to Uzbekistan
on the grounds that they faced criminal
charges. Once extradited, however, the
Uzbekistani government pressed political
charges against them for engaging in oppo36

sition activity. Kyrgyzstan, however, does
not retain a similar law banning political
opposition.
Over the past two years, the Kyrgyzstani
government has exhibited two different
approaches to the question of refugees
from Uzbekistan. On the one hand, it
has granted asylum to Uzbekistani refugees under its obligations in international
conventions. On the other hand, it has
returned refugees to Uzbekistan under
its obligations in the Minsk Agreement,
under political pressure from Uzbekistan.
Kyrgyzstan is torn between the international and regional agreements to which
it is part. While Kyrgyzstan ponders its
approach to the Uzbekistani refugees, the
refugees continue to live in fear that they
may be extradited to Uzbekistan.

East and Southeast Asia
and the Pacific
New Australian Administration
to Close Offshore
Detention Center
Symbolizing the end of the much criticized “Pacific Solution,” the Australian
government began resettling 75 Sri Lankan
refugees, the last group of asylum seekers
detained on Nauru, a small island nation
in Micronesia. As part of its 2007 platform, the newly elected Labor Government
promised to discontinue the practice of
intercepting refugees seeking asylum
before they reach Australia and detaining
them on foreign territory.
Former Prime Minister John Howard
initiated the Pacific Solution in response to
the 2001 standoff between the Australian
coast guard and a Norwegian cargo ship
that had rescued 433 asylum seekers, many
fleeing the war in Afghanistan. In what is
known as the Tampa Crisis, the Australian
navy first refused to allow the ship to
disembark, then forcibly removed the passengers and shipped them to foreign territories. New Zealand accepted 132 as
refugees, while the rest were housed in
detention camps in Nauru. The conservative Howard Administration diverted
asylum seekers abroad before they reached
Australian territory as part of a package of
policies designed to deter illegal immigration. In September 2001, the Parliament
passed the Migration Amendment Act,
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which excluded several of Australia’s
island territories from Australia’s migration zone, expanded the Department of
Immigration and Citizenship’s (DIAC)
power to intercept asylum seekers at sea,
and authorized the DIAC to process these
people abroad.
The Migration Amendment Act limits
the rights of asylum seekers who land in one
of the excised island territories or who are
intercepted at sea by the DIAC. Intercepted
asylum seekers are only eligible for temporary three-month visas and can no longer
apply for permanent Australian visas, even
if refugee status is granted. The Refugee
Review Tribunal cannot review intercepted
asylum seekers’ cases instead of the DIAC,
nor can the Immigration Minister overturn
visa rejections on public policy grounds.
The Pacific Solution allows Australia
to skirt its responsibilities to refugees
under international law. Australia’s Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission
admits that having different levels of rights
for asylum seekers processed in Australia
and on foreign territory violates the 1951
Convention on the Status of Refugees
(Convention). Nauru is not a signatory of
the Convention, which allows Australia to
circumvent limitations on the use of detention. Detaining asylum seekers should only
be permissible if “brief, absolutely necessary, and instituted after other options have
been implemented.”
Under the Pacific Solution, detaining
asylum seekers is standard procedure.
Some detainees from the Tampa Crisis
were held in the camps for nearly four
years before being resettled. Detainees on
Nauru are not provided with employment,
housing, education, or naturalization in a
manner that conforms to international regulations. They are not allowed to work or
mingle with Nauruan citizens. Almost all
detainees who have remained in the camps
for an extended period of time have developed some type of mental illness, which
has resulted in widespread insomnia and
many instances of self-mutilation. When
the camps opened in 2001, Nauru closed its
borders, severely restricting the possibility
of legal aid, and denied visas to Australian
lawyers representing the detainees.
Since 2001, Australia has detained
more than 1,600 asylum seekers from

countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq,
Pakistan, and Burma. The majority resettled in Australia, New Zealand, or Europe;
some voluntarily repatriated; and one died
in camp. Australian officials intercepted
a group of 83 asylum seekers fleeing the
Sri Lankan civil war in February 2007.
In September 2007, one of them went to
Australia for medical treatment, 75 were
granted refugee status, and on January 15,
2008, 21 were settled in Australia. The
other 54 recognized refugees will likely
see the same resolution this year. The fate
is less clear for the remaining seven who
were not granted refugee status. Six face
criminal charges for assaulting a Nauruan
citizen.
When the Nauruan detention camps
close, Australia will have spent over a billion dollars handling fewer than 1,700 refugees. The Pacific Solution was reportedly
over 25 times more costly than processing
asylum seekers at home. Furthermore, it
failed to deter illegal immigration.
The closure of the detention centers
will leave the economically destitute
island of Nauru without 20 percent of its
Gross Domestic Product. After 90 years of
intense phosphate mining by the British,
Australians, and New Zealanders, Nauru,
the smallest republic in the world, has no
arable land or natural resources. Since
gaining independence in 1968, Nauru
built financial wealth from the phosphate
industry. It later lost most of its capital and became a tax haven and moneylaundering center. Today 90 percent of
the 13,528 Nauruans are unemployed.
Nauruan Foreign Minister Kieren Keke
publicly requested that Australia build a
technical college on the island and provide
guest worker visas for Nauruans. While
Australian Federal Immigration Minister
Chris Evans promised to continue to support Nauru financially, no specific plans
have been finalized.

ASEAN Charter Provides
Opportunity to Strengthen
Regional Human Rights
Standards
Dr. Surin Pitsuwan may have more
influence over the future status of human
rights in Southeast Asia than any other
person. Inaugurated on January 7, 2008,
the Secretary General of the Association of
37

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) begins
his five-year term with the challenge of
overseeing the ratification of the 40-yearold regional organization’s first charter. Drafted on November 20, 2007, the
Charter would incorporate the ten member nations (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Laos, Malaysia, Burma, The Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) into a
legal entity, creating a European Unionstyle economic partnership, and committing each country to shared principles of
human rights and democracy.
Although the new Charter calls for
establishing an institution devoted solely
to upholding human rights, its weak language diminishes the prospect of enforcing
international standards. The Charter does
not mention norms such as those in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and does not allow ASEAN to suspend or
terminate membership of a non-compliant
nation. Currently only Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand, and the Philippines have national
human rights institutions. Even countries
with these institutions have difficulty
upholding human rights standards. In the
past few years, Philippine security forces
have extra-judicially killed hundreds of
political activists and members of leftist
political parties.
The Charter pays great deference to
the autonomy of individual governments,
despite having member states — for example Burma — with long records of human
rights abuses and resistance to international pressure. Continuing a tradition of
non-interference and consensus decisionmaking, the Charter limits ASEAN’s ability to protect citizens from government
abuses. Most recently the Burmese delegation prevented United Nations envoy
Ibrahim Gambari from briefing ASEAN on
the Burmese government’s bloody crackdown of wide-scale anti-government protests in 2007.
The lengthy ratification process
impedes implementation of improved
human rights standards. The Charter calls
for all ten countries to sign within a year.
Singapore signed during Pitsuwan’s inauguration ceremony and remains the only
country to ratify. Leaders of the Philippine
Parliament threatened to reject the Charter
unless the military dictatorship in Burma
continued on page 46
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Samphan referred to Pol Pot as a patriot
and claimed that in the Khmer Rouge government “[t]here was no policy of starving
people. Nor was there any direction set out
for carrying out mass killings.” Samphan
was charged with crimes against humanity
and war crimes for his role in the Khmer
Rouge regime.
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The secretive manner in which the
Charter was drafted also hinders the ratification process. Civil service groups such
as trade unions, alienated by the closed
door sessions, actively oppose ratification
without further input.
The Charter’s weak language and
ASEAN’s undefined role necessitate strong
leadership and vision from the Secretary
General in order to mold ASEAN into a
legitimate mechanism for upholding the
rights of citizens. Described as a persuasive politician, Pitsuwan received his
Ph.D. in political science and Middle
Eastern studies from Harvard University
in the United States, then ran for a position in the Parliament in his home town of
Nakhon Si Thammarat, Thailand, where
he served nine terms and was appointed
Minister of Foreign Affairs. After leaving
the foreign ministry in 2001, Pitsuwan was
appointed as a member of the Commission
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takes concrete steps toward reform, such
as freeing opposition leader and political
prisoner Aung San Suu Kyi. Suu Kyi has
been under house arrest since her National
League for Democracy party won Burma’s
last democratic parliamentary elections in
1990.
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on Human Security of the United Nations
and served as an advisor to the International
Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty, which produced the wellknown Responsibility to Protect report.
He also served on the International Labor
Organization’s World Commission on the
Social Dimension of Globalization.
Whether the new ASEAN charter
remains just an academic assertion of lofty
goals or an institution of fundamental human
rights depends largely on the decisions
made in the next five years. Commissioners
from the national human rights organizations of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand,
and the Philippines met on January 29 to
establish a framework for the proposed
regional body, the ASEAN Human Rights
Commission. During the two-day meeting,
the commissioners proposed that members
of the Commission be appointed by their
respective foreign ministries from a list of
candidates drawn by a selection committee consisting of national institutions and
civil society. The proposal will go back
to the four existing national commissions
and individual national governments for
further discussion before being submitted
to ASEAN as a whole.
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